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This paper deals with a network that can be loosely described as the ‘Counter Jihad Movement’ (CJM). 
CJM activists are a loose collection of bloggers, political parties, street movements, think tanks, campaign 
groups and pundits across several countries, all united by the shared belief that, to some degree, the 
‘Muslim world’ is at war with the ‘West’. Overall, the CJM shares a great deal with fascism and right wing 
extremism more broadly. However, the movement is varied enough that not all components sit easily 
alongside traditional conceptions of right wing extremism. In stark contrast to other far-right extremist 
groups, CJM contributors often code their rhetoric in the language of human rights. Occasionally the 
CJM have been indirectly implicated in violence. In July 2011, 77 people, the majority members of the 
left-wing Workers Youth League, were murdered in Norway in attacks carried out by Anders Behring 
Breivik. Breivik attempted to justify his attacks in a compendium of political thought that drew heavily on 
the writings of CJM sources. This article attempts to provide an overview of the CJM and highlight some 
of the key research debates in the area, including the rhetorical relationship between state-backed counter 
terrorism and the CJM, links to violence, and the similarities and contrasts between the CJM and 
traditional far-right narratives.    
Introduction 
This paper is intended to provide an overview of a movement in extreme right politics, termed here the 
Counter Jihad Movement (CJM). The CJM is difficult to categorise and analyse. Partly, this is a result of 
the novelty of some of the ideas expressed by contributors to the CJM and the rhetorical distance it has 
attempted to establish from more traditional forms of right-wing extremism. It is also a result of the 
complex make up of the CJM that stretches across various borders, often using digital platforms to 
connect a diverse range of groups and organisational forms. Despite these challenges, the CJM is a strain 
of extreme political thought that has tentatively begun to acquire a semblance of legitimacy. In addition, 
the common CJM narrative is positioned to take advantage of ongoing debates within wider civil society 
on security, immigration, terrorism and the status of Muslim populations.  
Attempts to describe the CJM have been manifold and various researchers have tended to start their 
investigations with different aspects of the wider CJM ranging from specific authors (Bangstad, 2013), 
terrorists (Jackson, 2013), narratives of the European Union (Denes, 2012) and street based movements 
(Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun; Goodwin, 2013). Nevertheless, it is hard to overlook the connections 
between these diverse groups. Goodwin’s description of the CJM portrays a scene characterised by 
diverse country specific movements linked to a wider international network 
‘…of think-tanks, bloggers and activists, the counter-Jihad scene incorporates the ‘defence leagues’ in Australia, 
Denmark, England, Finland, Norway, Poland, Scotland, Serbia and Sweden, groups such as Pro-Cologne and 
the Citizens’ Movement Pax Europa in Germany, Generation Identity in France, the ‘Stop the Islamization’ 
networks in Europe and the United States, the American Freedom Defense Initiative and the International Civil 
Liberties Alliance.’ (Goodwin, 2013: 3) 
In addition, several political parties have also been linked to the the CJM (Kundnani, 2012: 6-7; Gardell, 
2014; Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014).  
This survey considers the CJM as a broad and loose transnational political movement. This is beneficial 
for developing an understanding of the wider narrative of the CJM and worldview that underpins it, 
however it also risks homogenising a diverse range of political groups. It is equally important to 
understand how diverse the CJM is and that its manifestation is likely to be dependent on individual 
country contexts and specific movements. Berntzen and Sandberg (2014: 761) argue that the anti-Islamic 
movement they identify in Norway, while sharing rhetoric and identity with other groups, is distinctive to 
Norway. This is perhaps the most useful template for understanding the CJM, a loose central narrative 
focusing on broad and transnational themes from which more country specific groups can draw 
inspiration.  
One potential explanation for the hybrid of international movement and country specific groups is the 
extent to which actors within the CJM have exploited the web for curating and transmitting their 
messages. The prevalence of the web as organisational glue within the CJM has been noted in several 
accounts of the CJM and its activities (Jackson & Feldman, 2011: 32; Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013: 
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52; Lee, 2015). The web has often been seen as enabling the CJM to operate more effectively, bringing 
together geographically separate actors into a more effective international organisation (Meleagrou-
Hitchens & Brun, 2013: 3). This is also consistent with wider analysis of social movements and their use 
of the web to support decision making and increase the chances of engagement by reducing formal 
barriers to entry (Castells, 2012: 222). Activists within the CJM have also focused on the web as a key tool 
for organising and coordinating the movement under conditions of ‘repression’ (Bodissey, 2011a; see also 
Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013: 18). Ironically, this reliance on the web out of the need to maintain 
organisational resilience also makes the CJM accessible to researchers in a way that more closed and 
hierarchical movements are usually not (see for example: Digital Methods Initiative, 2013). 
Despite the adherence to loosely connected organisational forms, there have been attempts to foster 
cooperation between activists through a range of organisations such as the 910 Group (later the Centre 
for Vigilant Freedom and later still the International Civil Liberties Allaince), Stop Islamisation of Nations 
(SION) (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013: 18-20). Even more recently there are new groups emerging 
and forging international links. The German, Patriotic Citizens Against the Islamisation of the West 
(Pegida), founded in 2014, for example, is due to be re-launched in the UK in 2016. Despite attempts to 
coordinate and cooperate, the CJM is bound together principally by a shared set of beliefs and a desire to 
perpetuate and disseminate a particular world view rather than more formal and identifiable modes of 
organisation. 
Narratives of the CJM 
Several accounts have included summaries of the basic beliefs of the CJM (Carr, 2006; Zúquete, 2008; 
Fekete, 2011; Kundnani, 2012; Goodwin 2013; Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013; Gardell, 2014; Lee, 
2015). In addition, there is an abundance of material online describing the beliefs of the CJM written by 
activists themselves.1 Briefly, the beliefs of the CJM can be summed up as follows: 
 Islam is not seen as a religion but a political force hostile to the West. 
 The West is regarded as culturally, politically and demographically weak and in long term decline. 
 The West is seen as undergoing a process of Islamisation in which Muslim immigration leads to 
changes in the cultural, racial and religious composition of the West and Europe in particular. 
 Western leaders and elites such as the media and academia are regarded as either being complicit 
or incapable of preventing this process; often they are described as cultural Marxists.  
Adding to the complexity of defining the CJM, echoes of the ideas that form the CJM narrative are often 
present to some degree in mainstream political thinking. The idea that Islam, and Islamism specifically, 
can be incompatible with commonly accepted Western norms is by not the exclusive preserve of a 
fanatical fringe (Griffin, 2012: 219). Likewise, inclusion or exclusion of groups from the CJM, in 
particular because membership is so ethereal, can often appear to be political point scoring. A recent early 
draft of an extensive report on the CJM released by campaign group Hope Not Hate was widely criticised 
for including several figures considered moderates in some quarters (Dysch, 2015). Carr (2006:2) 
describes counter jihad ideas as having spread from a fascist fringe to the conservative mainstream and 
highlights writers such as Mark Steyn, Niall Ferguson and Melanie Phillips. In the Norwegian context, 
Berntzen and Sandberg (2014: 762) identify a continuum of political groups that subscribe to counter 
jihad narrative to a greater or lesser extent. Caution and individual researchers’ own careful judgement are 
ultimately the benchmarks for inclusion or exclusion from the CJM. However, two key markers can be 
helpful in distinguishing the extreme from the merely hawkish. 
Eurabia 
Several writers have suggested conspiracy as a key marker for extremism in different interpretations of the 
CJM narrative (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014: 762; Carr, 2006: 6). In particular, those who view the 
hypothesised Islamisation of Europe as being part of a deliberate and coordinated political project under 
the hand of Islamists and multiculturalists are generally presented as more extreme than those who lament 
the weakness of European leaders in the face of globalisation. The more conspiratorial version of the 
                                                          




CJM narrative draws heavily on the Eurabia thesis which constitutes an underlying master template. The 
theory itself was published in Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, written by Bat Ye’or in 2005 (a pen name for 
Gisèle Littman)2. At the heart of Eurabia is an understanding of global politics based on a heroic version 
Israel and a Muslim world with an unreformed concept of jihad at its core. Europe meanwhile is 
presented as a nest of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. Europe, Ye’or argues, has surrendered to 
Islam and is in a state of submission (described as dhimmitude) in which Europe is forced to deny its own 
culture, stand silently by in the face of Muslim atrocities, accept Muslim immigration, and pay tribute 
through various types of economic assistance. The blame for this, according to the theory, rests with a 
range of folk devils including: communists, fascists (both Vichy collaborators and neo-Nazis), the media, 
universities, mosques and Islamic cultural centres, European bureaucrats and above all, the powerful 
Euro-Arab dialogue (EAD).3 Unsurprisingly, Ye’or’s thesis has come in for criticism. In 2006, one 
academic described the Eurabia thesis as ‘flat-out barking gibbersh’ (Carr, 2006: 7-8). A somewhat more 
sympathetic review highlighted Ye’or’s acknowledgement that not all Muslims were hostile (Miller, 2006). 
Inevitably, post Breivik, Ye’or’s work has been subject to further criticism (Bangstad, 2013: 370). 
Despite the centrality of this conspiracy, the day-to-day role of Eurabia in the CJM may have been 
overstated to some degree (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013: 46). Analysis of websites linked to the 
CJM suggests strongly that the Eurabia theory is not often referred to (Lee, 2015). However, while the 
Eurabia thesis may not have everyday relevance within the CJM, it has attained broader significance 
within the movement: for example prominent CJM activist Fjordman titled one extensive series of essays 
Defeating Eurabia. It is also worth noting that despite the significance given to Eurabia as a political tract, it 
exists in a wider universe of similarly themed accounts including writers such as Oriana Fallaci, Mark 
Steyn, Melanie Phillips and George Weigel (Carr, 2006: 2-3; Bangstad, 2013: 371). 
Homogeneity 
In addition to adherence to the Eurabia theory, a further possible marker for extremism is the extent to 
which Muslims are reduced to a homogenous group in discourse (Fekete, 2011: 35; Melagrou-Hitchens & 
Brun, 2013: 53). In discussing the term ‘Islamophobia’, Zúquete (2008: 323) argues that a defining aspect 
is the tendency to treat Muslims as a monolithic block. This point was also a central tool for 
differentiating between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ views of Islam in an early report on Islamophobia produced by 
the Runnymeade Trust (Conway, 1997). Some CJM activists suggest that they oppose only extremist 
Islam rather than Islam itself. However, this is often tokenistic and liable to be rejected in subsequent 
statements (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013: 54). Narratives are also likely to differ according to 
audiences, with online communities, for example, being far less guarded in their analysis when compared 
to public pronouncements (Ibid.). Even from within the CJM, some activists are keen to distance the 
movement from stereotyping and hatred of Muslims whilst acknowledging the propensity of some 
‘keyboard commandos’ to lapse into hate speech (Goska, 2015). An alternative approach by CJM activists 
has been to argue that precautionary approach is necessary given the scale of the threat posed. Ye’or (who 
acknowledges that not all Muslims believe the same things) argues that hostility to non-believers is a 
major trend and that to ignore it would be ‘criminal and suicidal’ (Ye’or, 2011: 30). 
Studying the CJM: key debates 
The CJM is complex and as a result it has sparked a number of ongoing debates about its nature. What 
follows aims to highlight some of the key debates emerging from the development of the CJM. 
The CJM and the extreme right 
Perhaps the foremost debate in this area asks where the CJM sits in respect to extreme right ideology. 
Superficially, it is easy to see the CJM as something apart from stereotypical fascist groups. Certainly the 
CJM sees itself as something apart from other extreme right groups (Melagrou-Hitchens & Brun: 29). 
This claim depends heavily however on two factors: the definition of the extreme right and the specific 
component of the CJM analysed. 
                                                          
2 For more on Littman, her publications and qualifications see: Bangstad, 2013. 




The extreme right can be thought of as a party family with common characteristics: nationalism, racism, 
xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state (Mudde, 2000: 11). Nationalism in particular can be seen 
as the hub from which other features extend, providing a justification for demonising outsiders and 
rejecting liberalism (Copsey, 2008: 78). The centrality of nationalism, however, is on first sight slightly 
inconsistent within the CJM given the prominence of writers who concern themselves so much with 
broader ‘Western’ culture as opposed to national identities. There are two issues here. The first is the 
focus on the European level as opposed to a national level political unit. Although many CJM activists do 
focus on the supra-national level, this is often localised in country-specific mobilisations, e.g. the English 
Defence League (EDL). Second, the reliance on culture as opposed to more stereotypical ethno-
nationalism is also seen as atypical of extreme right groups (Kundnani, 2012: 6 Meleagrou-Hitchens & 
Brun: 35). Indeed, the expansion of nationalism to a broader cultural level in extreme right narratives has 
been suggested as a potential source of future conflict as a commitment to broad Western values and 
seems likely to jar with the desire to protect national sovereignty (Zúquete, 2008: 329). However, its 
greater focus on the cultural rather than national level does not exclude the CJM from the extreme right 
space. For Jackson (2013: 250), the cultural turn does not represent any dramatic shift in thinking. 
Instead, culture is used to construct a demonised other in much the same way that race was previously. 
Equally Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun (2013:37) also see a potential for illiberalism in cultural 
nationalism. The substitution of culture for race in this way is also a trend in other extreme right groups, 
including those with explicitly fascist roots (Rhodes, 2009: 145; Edwards, 2012; Hafez, 2014).  
Other criteria for membership to the extreme right family are also open to some question in the case of 
the CJM. Certainly, CJM writers have notionally incorporated democracy and a commitment to human 
rights (in particular free speech) into their narrative. However, this position is entirely consistent with a 
number of extreme right groups that have attempted to transition to more electorally-friendly (but still 
extreme-right wing) narratives such as the French Front National and the British National Party 
(Mammone, 2009). The authenticity of many of these transitions has been widely questioned by those 
working on the extreme right with some suggesting that they are merely superficial masks for a more 
extreme inward face concealed from the public (Copsey, 2007; Mammone, 2009). 
Analysis of specific CJM activists has certainly suggested that some aspects of the CJM are more extreme 
than others. Paul Jackson analysed the writings of Fjordman (AKA Peder Jensen) as reproduced in the 
Breivik manifesto and argues that they:  
‘…conform to a typically fascist discourse that gravitates around tropes of heterophobia, extreme national 
purification, and political revolution emerging from a period of warfare and crisis.’ (Jackson, 2013: 248)  
Jackson later summarises the emergent ideology underpinning Breivik and supported by Jensen as 
‘Islamophobic fascism’ (Jackson, 2013: 265). Other analyses of the Breivik manifesto as a whole also seem 
to support this view, identifying Breivik’s position as within the ‘fascist tradition’ based on his adherence 
to a romantic warrior ideal and fixation with (European) rebirth (Gardell, 2014: 132-3). In contrast, 
analysis of other activists within the CJM has stopped short or categorising them as fascist. Melagrou-
Hitchens & Brun (2013: 33), focusing to some extent on the EDL, agree that they exhibit many fascist 
tropes, including an affinity for marches and speeches with little regard to their consequences, but overall 
they fall short of the revolutionary changes demanded by archetypal fascist groups. Stemming from this, 
Jackson highlights the range of ideological extremism within the wider CJM space – suggesting that where 
anti-Muslim discourse is the basis of political mobilisation it tends to be manifested in the discourse of 
‘neo-populist politicians’ such as the Dutch Geert Wilders rather than the more explicit fascism of Jensen 
(Jackson, 2013: 251). In summary, the ideological position of the CJM is as varied as the activist within it. 
Given the extreme heterophobia on display in either interpretation, both revolutionary and populist 
positions can be interpreted as lying within the extreme right space.  
The CJM and violence 
Regardless of how the CJM is classified ideologically, the rhetoric in some quarters of the CJM indicates 
an ambiguous relationship with violence. While the CJM as a whole has not been seen to deliberately 
engage in, support, or condone, terroristic political violence, there is a broader question over the extent to 
which the CJM bears responsibility for acts of violence seemingly inspired by its activists (Meleagrou-
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Hitchens & Brun, 2013: 2). Certainly the CJM (in the European context) has been explored explicitly as a 
catalyst for political violence (Kundnani, 2012; Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013). 
The clearest case of violence linked to the CJM is that of Anders Breivik; the commonalities between 
Breivik and the CJM have been noted by several writers (Kundnani, 2012: 4; Jackson, 2013; Meleagrou-
Hitchens & Brun, 2013:2; Goodwin, 2013: 4; Titley, 2014). Prior to launching his attacks, Breivik posted a 
compendium that featured the plagiarised writings of prominent CJM activists (Gardell, 2014). The 
relative significance of different activists has been speculated at, but key figures include Bat Ye’or, Robert 
Spencer and Fjordman (Bertnzen & Sandberg, 2014:763; Gardell, 2014: 132). Of the 772,643 words of 
the Breivik manifesto, 112,735 were reproductions of Fjordman’s writings (Jackson, 2013: 248).  
Despite these influences, Breivik was not claimed by any wider political group, lacked extensive social 
networks and is often described as a ‘lone wolf’ terrorist (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014: 772). Certainly this 
explanation has been embraced by CJM. Following the attacks Fjordman published several essays 
attempting to distance Breivik from the wider movement (Fjordman 2011; 2012). More recently 
Fjordman published an essay attacking Breivik’s mental state claiming that Breivik wanted to damage 
‘Islam-critical’ writers (Spencer, 2014; Fjordman, 2015). Despite attempts to distance Breivik from the 
CJM, the fact remains that he was able to steep himself in the counter jihad world view in part thanks to 
the efforts of CJM activists. Jackson suggests that such writings provide a ‘license to hate’, or a framework 
to justify acts of violence (Jackson, 2013: 248, see also Kallis, 2007).  
It should also be considered that the Breivik attacks were spectaculars, commanding media attention 
around the world, and included a compendium conveniently setting out the motivation. However, most 
violence directed against minority groups does not make the headlines and it is not nearly so planned. 
Street movements in particular have the potential to lead to violence, in particular violence directed 
against groups demonised by political rhetoric. The English Defence League’s demonstrations were often 
accompanied by violence directed against counter demonstrators, the police and Asians (Treadwell & 
Garland: 2011: 629-630; BBC, 2015b). In addition, there is a constant low level background of hate 
incidents that also seem to reflect the CJM narrative although the degree to which this violence can be 
described as ideological is open to question. 
CJM and official security narratives 
Lastly, it is worth considering the extent to which the CJM narrative aligns with more mainstream political 
narratives. Following 9/11, Muslim communities in Western countries have become potential targets for 
both the extreme right and to some extent government counter terrorist policies (Abbas, 2004). Some 
argue that Muslims’ outsider status predates the 9/11 attacks (Abbas, 2004: 32; Carr, 2006: 18; Fekete, 
2011: 39). Nevertheless, the focus on counter terrorism activities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks has been 
presented as leading to anti-Muslim sentiment and furthering exclusion (Fekete, 2004: 4).  
The idea that extreme groups can feed off, and in the process radicalise, one another is well established 
(Eatwell, 2006). Kundnani (2012: 10) develops this model of cumulative extremism further to include 
government security narratives, highlighting the (unwitting) alignment between the counter-terrorism 
rhetoric of governments and the claims made by extreme right groups. In particular, he identifies the 
reliance on a values and identity narrative that conforms closely to that of counter jihad groups 
(Kundnani, 2012: 15). Fekete (2011: 40) also notes the importance of locating counter jihad politics in the 
context of the global security environment. Further analysis is needed in order to properly contextualise 
the links between government and counter jihad narratives, however this initial speculation highlights the 
salience of the counter jihad narrative given the wider political climate. 
Conclusions  
This paper is intended to provide a brief and broad overview of the CJM. Crucially, the CJM is presented 
as being fluid. Different observers will draw a different political line around the movement, often largely 
reflecting their own political concerns. While there are some useful markers of extremism, a researcher’s 
considered judgement and extreme caution are essential. Indeed, it is worth questioning the extent to 
which the CJM can really be considered a coherent movement. Despite the fact that activists themselves 
recognise the existence of the movement, the lines between membership and non-membership are 
blurred and contested. Despite this, there is value to considering the ‘top level’ narrative of the counter 
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jihad in order to understand the common components in the narratives of a diverse set of groups ranging 
from political activists to fully registered political parties. Readers should recognise, however, that this 
narrative is filtered through national and organisational concerns on the ground.    
Of greater importance is the possible future challenge the CJM represents to the existing political 
narrative in Europe and the US. Explicitly revolutionary fascist groups have proved largely easy to 
identify and contain politically and even attempts to sever the connection with previously explicitly fascist 
ideology have met with relatively mixed success. The War on Terror and the ensuing counter terrorism 
focus of national governments and civic society however, have created a massive target of opportunity for 
those extreme right groups able to take advantage of it, be they new groups or groups with a longer 
history attempting to make the populist transition by shifting from anti-Semitic to anti-Muslim narratives. 
The continued use of force by the US and European powers in the Middle East, the rise of ISIS, and the 
refugee crisis, all contribute to the salience, and therefore the political potential, of the counter jihad 
narrative.  
Many of the groups aligned with the CJM so far can be dismissed as flash in the pan social movements 
and ultra fringe political parties and in general there is limited evidence so far that the CJM world view is 
gaining serious traction in civic debates. However, there are worrying aberrations. The (currently) ongoing 
Trump primary campaign in the US (Iftikhar, 2015), the success of the formerly fascist French Front 
National in the wake of the Paris attacks (Wilsher, 2015), and the willingness of Czech President Miloš 
Zeman to address anti-Muslim campaigners (Lane, 2015), seem to suggest that in some circles the CJM 
narrative is seen as having political value. At least one scholar has also highlighted the ‘lethal 
mainstreaming’ of previously taboo ideas as established political actors seek to cash in on far-right 
narratives in an atmosphere of crisis (Kallis, 2013: 221). The rhetoric of the CJM, in particular its focus on 
human, may constitute the boldest attempt yet to normalise what is (in many cases) an exclusionary 
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